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[I]f everyone tries to live off of rents and nobody invests in making anything, then 
plainly capitalism is headed towards a crisis 
David Harvey, Seventeen contradictions and the end of capitalism, 2014, xii 
 
Abstract. Rent seeking is central to processes of financialisation and crisis 
formation, not least in tourism economies. Rent seeking involves the making and 
taking of rent gaps geared to expand unearned incomes in the form of interest 
revenues from debt and rental revenues from property. Changes in built 
environments become increasingly determined by where rent gaps can be created 
and appropriated, rather than as outcomes of conflict-laden, democratic, use-value 
oriented decision-making. In this paper we address the role of creating and 
appropriating rent gaps in the formation of the Spanish crisis. The normative gist 
of the paper is to ask: How might we go about making rent gap theory not true? 
The analysis highlights four key dimensions: commodification vs commons; 
social polarization; financialization vs democracy; and ideology underlying 
political, legal and institutional change.  
Keywords: rent gaps, crisis, financialization, market fundamentalism. 
 
Introduction 
 
Rent seeking – “a polite and rather neutral-sounding way” to say 
accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2014) – is central to processes of 
financialization and the formation of crises, not least in tourism economies 
(Blázquez et al 2015; Murray 2015; Vives & Rullan 2014). Rent seeking 
involves the making and taking of rent gaps, geared to expand interest 
revenues from debt and rental revenues from property (with no 
unambiguous line between them). The scales and concentrations of 
economic and political power driving the creation and appropriation of 
rent gaps have escalated remarkably in recent decades. The entangled 
processes of uneven (re)development, gentrification, displacement, social 
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polarization and touristification associated with capturing rent gaps are 
now understood as planetary (Slater 2015; Wyly 2015; Lees et al 2015, 
2016). Neil Smith presented rent gap theory in the context of a critique of 
consumer sovereignty and the naturalization of markets. As ideological 
lodestar, market fundamentalism legitimates far-reaching processes of 
commodification and privatization, opening up spaces for financialization. 
Financialization forges social relations conducive to the penetration of 
finance into the production, exchange and consumption of (built) 
environments. It enhances financial control over the governance of human 
niche construction by expanding spheres for financial ‘investments’, 
whereby unearned rentier revenues increasingly flow to a resurgent rentier 
class. Exchange value becomes master; use value becomes slave (Harvey 
2014). Consequently, changes in built environments become increasingly 
determined by where rent gaps can be created and appropriated, rather than 
as outcomes of conflict-laden democratic processes of use-value oriented 
decision-making. In this paper we sketch an analysis of crisis formation in 
Spain as largely the product of making and taking rent gaps, highlighting 
four key dimensions of social relations constitutive of rent gap 
mechanisms: property relations, social polarization, exchange-value driven 
decision-making (financialization), and market fundamentalism. 
 
Commodification vs commons 
 
Private property in land constitutes the very foundation of rent gaps, 
as it allows for extraction of capitalized land rents, speculative bidding on 
future rents, and the discernment of potential rents under ‘higher and 
better’ land uses. Private property rights “confer on the owner near-
monopoly control over land and improvements, monopoly control over the 
uses to which a certain space is put” (Smith 1979: 541). These rights 
include the right to unearned rentier incomes, a form of free-riding on the 
work of others (Sayer 2015). Property rights in land come in many forms, 
the complexity of which “is quite staggering” (Harvey 1982: 276). Making 
sense of this staggering complexity must center on “the legal construction 
of both place and mobility” (Blomley 1994: 225). Place becomes broken 
into isolated spatial commodities for which land markets are formed: 
“perhaps the weirdest of all the undertakings of our ancestors” (Polanyi 
2001: 187). The expansion of private property, “by restricting access, can 
deprive others of a place to live, even of the right to life”, thereby raising 
the question “whether people can be said to have a right to, literally, a 
place in the world” (Smith 1994: 41-42). With forced displacement among 
the most widespread human rights violations in the world (COHRE 2009), 
it seems “as if there is a systematic plan to expel low-income and 
unwanted populations from the face of the earth” (Harvey 2010a: 245). 
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This mobility is forced: it has nothing to do with the right to mobility, and 
everything to do with violating the right to stay put, the right to place 
(Clark 2011). 
The struggle over legal access to land in Spain has a long history 
that can be traced back at least to 18th century liberal land reforms and 
expropriations. These served purposes to bail out state finances and create 
conditions for capitalist agricultural production. With considerable 
regional variation, these processes displayed two common features (Tomás 
y Valiente 1978; Gilabert 2003; Herr 1991).  First, established regulations 
and praxis regarding use of and access to land were dismantled. Second, 
the nature of landed property was more strictly defined (public, private, 
communal, etc). This process served specific interests, creating winners 
and losers. 19th century Spain saw strong forces seeking to remove rigid 
feudal rules for acquisition of land, in order to implant a system of 
commodified land conducive to a market capitalist economy (Casares 
2000; Herr 2015). Culminating in the 1920s, the outcome was vast 
privatization and commodification of land all over Spain. Most land ended 
up unsurprisingly in the hands of the already wealthy (Tomás y Valiente 
1978; Moreno Ballesteros 2016). The move from propiedad imperfecta to 
propiedad perfecta (Artola 1978) formed the cornerstone for the formation 
of land markets and speculation in exchange values of land.  
Between 1836 and 1900 expropriations of church and municipal 
lands (bienes comunales and bienes de “propios”) transferred to private 
landowners accounted for ca 20% of Spanish territory (Tomás y Valiente 
1978; Tortella 1994). Sold to highest bidders, very little went to landless or 
poor peasants, who were largely displaced from leased lands when 
ownership changed hands or rents became prohibitively high. The poor 
experienced extreme hardships when their livelihoods disappeared together 
with free (or affordable) access to land, pasture, water and woods 
(Sánchez-Albornoz 1968; Hernanz 1993; Ibáñez 1993). The concentration 
of vast areas of land, forests, mountains and water in private hands 
exacerbated social polarization and impacted heavily on the landscape, in 
which two thirds of the population was employed in agriculture (Fontana 
1975; Swyngedouw 1999; Carr 2000; Infante-Amate 2012). The reforms 
strengthened an urban economic elite more interested in speculative 
investment (often with linkages to global capital) than in rural 
development (Tomás y Valiente 1978; Ibáñez 1993). The commodification 
of land for creation of urban and tourist spaces has led to direct and 
indirect displacements of people and their livelihoods, impacted heavily on 
ecosystems and erased whole socio-cultural landscapes (Aledo Tur 2008; 
Murray 2015). 
During the 1980s Spain initiated policy reforms that can be 
characterized as neoliberalization, strengthening links to global capital by 
34     Turismo y crisis, turismo colaborativo y ecoturismo 
 
 
opening its economy to the inflow of private investments. The 1990s 
subsequently saw a frenzy of financial de-(re-)regulation and the 
introduction of new legal mechanisms that invited and empowered new 
financial actors engaged in land and real estate speculation, spurring rapid 
urbanization and expansion of tourism (Rullan 1999; Soler 2001; Vives & 
Rullan 2014). These sectors are characterized by temporary, low-skilled 
and low-wage employment. Consequently, while real estate and financial 
incomes experienced unprecedented growth, the share of income to labor 
decreased from 60.2% in 1996 to 52.3% in 2012. The Spanish economy 
was spinning on rent seeking activities as land prices increased 500% 
between 1997 and 2007 (Álvarez 2012; Royo 2013). This dramatic 
increase both generated and was the outcome of massive speculative flows 
of ‘investments’ geared to capturing rent gaps – a swell of high velocity 
chrematistic money-making-money, largely based on fantasy.   
 
(In)equalities 
 
That the growing literature on inequality attracts so many new 
readers and analysts is not only because there is so much of it to study but 
also because it makes such a great difference in so many ways, from a 
broad array of social and health problems, to trust, democracy and 
willingness to assume social and environmental responsibility (Wilkinson 
& Pickett 2009). Inequality is “not just about the size of wallets. It is a 
socio-cultural order, which (for most of us) reduces our capabilities to 
function as human beings, our health, our self-respect, our sense of self, as 
well as our resources to act and participate in this world” (Therborn 2013: 
1). The costs of The Killing Fields of Inequality are immense: human 
suffering, unrealized flourishing, disabled democracy, impaired trust, loss 
of solidarity and security, and a whole raft of social, psychological and 
physical health problems. Relatedly, inequalities also underlie rent gaps, 
especially the dynamic strength of rent gaps as mechanisms driving urban 
change. With extreme concentrations of income and wealth comes the 
power at the one end to make and take rent gaps, be they in inner-city 
neighborhoods or the re-scaled rent gaps of large land grabs in the global 
periphery. At the other end, those weakened by inequalities are more 
vulnerable to displacement, as rent gaps are created and captured: Their 
homes and livelihoods cannot compete in the spatial market with ‘higher 
and better’ uses geared to expand rentier revenues. 
Between 1850 and 2000, Spain’s aggregate economic activity 
multiplied by a factor of 43, while GDP per capita grew 16-fold (Prados de 
la Escosura 2008). The general trends that emerge are rising income 
inequalities from 1850 until the end of World War I, followed by a period 
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of declining inequalities (with the exception of the Civil War years 1936–
1939), after which the first period of the Franco dictatorship (1939-1953) 
saw a marked rise in inequalities as the share of population in poverty 
returned to levels last seen prior to the 1920s. Inequalities declined again, 
first sharply in the late 1950s and then gradually until 1980 when it 
stabilized and then to rose again in the 1990s (Quiroga & Coll 2000; 
Prados de la Escosura 2008; Pijoan-Mas & Sánchez-Marcos 2010). 
Another analysis relates a sharp decline in inequality during the late 1970s 
with the transition from dictatorship to democracy (Inchausti 1999). Since 
1981 the top 1% of the population controls around 8% of incomes reaching 
8.79% in 2005, while the top 10% accumulates 33% of wealth (Alvaredo 
& Saez 2009; Atkinson et al. 2011). Recently, from 2004 to 2014, income 
inequality has again increased markedly as reflected in Gini coefficients 
rising from 31.0 to 34.7; comparable to Greece 34.5 and Romania 34.7, but 
well above the average of 30.9 for the 28 countries of the European Union 
(Eurostat 2016). 
Ownership of capital and land in Spain has historically been highly 
concentrated (Martin 1990). This ownership generates revenues in the 
form of interest, rent and various forms of capital gains. Alvaredo & Saez 
(2009) studied the evolution of income composition of the top 0.05% from 
1961 to 1981 and found a dramatic shift from real estate to financial assets 
and from farm to non-farm business income. They conclude that the rapid 
economic expansion from 1961 to 1981 involved traditional land and farm 
owners falling behind at the top of the distribution. This shift however took 
place with no change in overall income concentration. From 1982 to 2004, 
average wealth grew by a factor of 2.4 (with real estate accounting for 
80% throughout the period), while the corresponding figure for income is a 
mere 1.5. Growth in average wealth has been driven primarily by rising 
real estate prices and to a lesser degree by increasing corporate stock 
prices (Alvaredo & Saez 2009). 
 
Financialization vs democracy 
 
The “increasing tendency to treat the land as a pure financial asset” 
underlies “the form and the mechanics of the transition to the purely 
capitalistic form of property in land” (Harvey 1982: 347). The same can be 
said today about music, words, ideas, organisms and ourselves, as 
‘intellectual property rights’, bio-prospecting and branding open up new 
spheres for financial ‘earnings’ through speculative ‘investment’. Once 
treated as pure financial asset with expectations on financial yield, these 
are also reduced to just another “special branch of the circulation of 
interest-bearing capital” (Harvey 1982: 347). Financialization involves the 
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subordination of use values to exchange values, in sphere after sphere, 
thereby expanding the volumes of ‘investment opportunities’ for ever more 
concentrated centers of financial wealth. Financialization is dialectically 
entwined with the previously considered aspects, exploiting while 
intensifying inequalities in economic and political power, and driving the 
privatization of commons in order to expand the sphere of property as 
investment opportunities open to speculation on changes in exchange 
values. 
Establishment of private property rights in land, in its broadest sense 
including bodies of water and elements of land commonly called natural 
resources, creates a foundation for the commodification of environments 
by judicially and administratively rendering specific parts tradable on 
markets, where their exchange value can guide decisions on investment. 
The profit- and rent-seeking behavior of finance capital and landed-
developer interests drive the formation of market relations through the 
privatization and commodification of built and natural environments, 
extending the process wherever property relations retain the characteristics 
of commons that hinder the free flow of financial investment. 
Environments are securitized and enter the orbit of finance capital as 
potential sites for investment, or disinvestment, depending on their 
expected yield to shareholders. 
Financialization is a process whereby privatization, 
commodification and securitization of the environment allow for the 
penetration of financial control and decision-making into the fabric of 
societies and (built) environments. It has involved “the phenomenal 
expansion of financial assets relative to real activity (by three times over 
the last 30 years)” and “the absolute and relative expansion of speculative 
as opposed to or at the expense of real investment” (Fine 2013: 6, emphasis 
added). Ever in search of new fields to securitize and invest in, the 
financial sector actively engages in the creation of conditions allowing 
nature “to circulate as financial capital” (Prudham 2007: 259), entailing 
enclosures of resource commons and the displacement of people, their 
livelihoods, knowledge and practices. 
We emphasize investment because, as Sayer convincingly argues, it 
is “the most dangerously ambiguous word in our economic vocabulary” 
(2015: 34). Masking the difference between wealth extraction and wealth 
creation, it camouflages the former as the latter. Sayer distinguishes 
object-oriented definitions that focus on what is invested in (enabling 
production of new use values in goods, services and skills) from 
‘investor’-oriented definitions that focus on “the financial gains of the 
‘investor’ from any kind of spending, lending, saving, purchase of 
financial assets or speculation – regardless of whether they contribute to 
any objective investment, or anything socially useful” (Sayer 2015: 34–
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35). The slippage between these usages is a source of mystification, 
concealing the subordination of use value to exchange value, while 
obscuring the moral difference “between contributing to the creation of 
something useful and just getting a return, no matter what” (Sayer 2015: 
36). Sayer associates the rise of exchange-value-oriented ‘investment’ 
relative to use-value-oriented investment to “the emergence of 
‘financialised’ capitalism, which prioritizes making money out of money, 
instead of the tricky business of organizing people to produce goods and 
services. It’s truly extraordinary that we treat these different things as one 
and the same without even noticing” (Sayer 2015: 36).  
The growing role of financial and speculative activities in the 
Spanish economy since the 1960s, mentioned above, took a qualitative 
leap with financial de(re-)regulations in the 1990s, allowing financial 
actors to more thoroughly dominate the Spanish economy. Both domestic 
and foreign capital privileged housing and real estate markets as the site of 
‘investment’. In the early 1990s, new construction exceeded 200,000 
dwellings per year. This increased to ca 300,000 in 1995-97, ca 400,000 in 
1998, rose to ca 500,000 by 2003 and culminated at over 650,000 between 
2004 and 2007 (FOESSA 2015). Over 6.5 million new dwellings were 
built between 1998 and 2008. By the end of 2008 the housing stock 
exceeded 25 million, amounting to one dwelling per 1.83 inhabitants 
(Coq‐Huelva 2013). Between 1997 and 2007, Spanish household debt rose 
from 61% of gross disposable income to 139% (Álvarez 2012). 
Lending to both producers and home buyers, finance capital rapidly 
accumulated incredible volumes of ‘unearned incomes’ (Sayer 2015) 
flowing through interest payments directly attached to the realization of 
potential land rents. In the process, it “enrolled livelihoods into cycles of 
global financial and real-estate speculation”, while “signing off significant 
parts of future labour, decisionmaking capacity and well-being to 
mortgage debt repayments” (García-Lamarca & Kaika 2016: 313). 
 
Market fundamentalism vs egalitarian ethos 
 
The myth of market fundamentalism is changing everything, from 
workplaces, communities, education, health care and public institutions, to 
our relationships with our environment and understandings of self 
(Michaels 2011; Verhaeghe 2014). One form of social economic 
integration – market exchange – is mythologized at the expense of other 
forms: state redistribution and community reciprocity (Polanyi 2001). 
Market fundamentalism “conveys the quasi-religious certainty expressed 
by contemporary advocates of market self-regulation”, bearing an “affinity 
with religious fundamentalisms that rely on revelation or a claim to truth 
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independent of the kind of empirical verification that is expected in social 
sciences” (Block & Somers 2014: 3).   
The struggle for ideas has always been central to the making of the 
future. Neil Smith saw gentrification and the making and taking of rent 
gaps as “increasingly constructed through the vocabulary of the frontier 
myth” (Smith 1996: 13). More recently, he insisted that “we are in a 
moment when the future is radically open” (Smith 2015: 964), and that 
forging alternatives requires that we free ourselves of “the economic 
conveyor belt of capitalist common sense which lurches the social body 
from crisis to crisis” (Smith 2011: 265). Just as the roll-out of variegated 
neoliberalization since the 1970s was largely orchestrated and guided 
through ideational path dependencies (Blyth 2002, Harvey 2005) – one 
moment in a longer history of imposing visions to reshape the world 
(Smith 2005) – the creation of alternatives cannot otherwise than build to 
some extent upon reinvigorated traditions with very different integrative 
myths and metaphors. It is not only so “that without metaphors, scientific 
inquiry would go nowhere” (Harvey 2010b: 198). Social movements and 
societal change cannot either move without the power of better ideas, 
metaphors and foundational myths through which to perform the creation 
of alternatives.  
In Spain, the ideal of home ownership – commodified homes 
supplied and demanded on housing markets – became the ideological 
lodestar that led political, legal and institutional change. Spain’s first 
Minister of Housing, Falangist ideologue José Luis Arrese, “epitomized 
the role of housing in the regime’s ideology in his famous statement ‘we 
want a country of homeowners, not proletarians’, and his promise to ‘make 
a spring of homes grow in Spain’” (García-Lamarca & Kaika 2016: 317). 
If the myth of market fundamentalism is co-evolutionary partner 
with privatization, polarization and financialization, working together to 
make rent gap theory true, then making rent gap theory not true must 
involve engaging alternative myths and metaphors. Against the rugged 
pioneer individual on the market frontier, the ‘self-made man’, we must 
emphasize our fundamental interdependence, and the interdependence of 
individual and collective. Indeed, “the two fundamental traits of our 
enduring egalitarian ethos, valuing sharing and autonomy, are connected at 
their roots” (Clark & Clark 2009: 316; cf. Clark & Clark 2012). Over the 
long stretch of human history, we have displayed “patterns of behavior that 
systematically prevented overreaching individuals from achieving 
dominance” (Shryock & Smail 2011: 255). We have a rich history from 
which to forge more beneficial myths and metaphors conducive to making 
rent gap theory not true. 
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Conclusion 
 
These are the forces that make rent gap theory true: 
commodification of land/space/nature, polarized social relations, 
financialized decision-making, and market fundamentalism. From a 
dialectical co-evolutionary perspective, no one of the four spheres 
“prevails over the others, even as there exists within each the possibility 
for autonomous development”: we should not “see one of the spheres as 
determinant” (Harvey 2010a: 128, 132). Our admittedly superficial effort 
to analyze the Spanish crisis in terms of making and taking rent gaps 
suggests that these same forces, in all the historical-geographical 
contingencies specific to Spain, have played key roles in the formation of 
the Spanish crisis. In seeking “openings for the construction of viable 
political-economic alternatives” (Harvey 2016: 322), the line of analysis 
we have sketched suggests that in order to avoid similar calamities in the 
future, our political economies need to be reconstructed such that we: de-
commodify land, and work together to cultivate and institutionalize social 
practices of commoning; institutionalize ceilings on inequalities by 
legislating floors and ceilings on both  incomes and wealth; move 
decision-making from shareholders, boardrooms and the trading floors of 
stock exchanges to democratic bodies, placing use-values in focus; and 
replace market fundamentalism with recognition of our interdependence, 
how we mutually constitute one another, how we are dependent on and 
owe solidarity to each other. 
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